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Abstract
We use game theoretic models to take an in-depth look at the dynamics of
discrimination and academic collaboration. We find that in collaboration networks,
small minority groups may be more likely to end up being discriminated against
while collaborating. We also find that discrimination can lead members of different
social groups to mostly collaborate with in-group members, decreasing the effective
diversity of the social network. Drawing on previous work, we discuss how decreases
in the diversity of scientific collaborations might negatively impact the progress of
epistemic communities.
1 Introduction
Philosophers of science have used formal models to argue that the structure of communi-
cation and collaboration networks matter in science.1 One finding from this literature is
that diversity of beliefs within an epistemic community is key to ensuring that the group
eventually arrives at true beliefs about the world, and that network structure can be cru-
cial to preserving this diversity (Zollman, 2010). At the same time, feminist philosophers
of science have argued that personal diversity, i.e., diversity with respect to personal
identity markers such as gender, race, and cultural origin, is an important source of such
epistemic diversity.2
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For examples of compelling arguments by philosophers of science for the importance of diversity in science
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Given this work, we ask: what factors influence the diversity of epistemic collabo-
ration networks? And, in particular: might discrimination impact these networks? We
start by looking at the emergence of discriminatory norms in fixed collaboration net-
works. Such norms commonly evolve, and in particular we find support for previous
work showing that minority status alone can make it more likely for a social group to
be disadvantaged by bargaining norms (Bruner, 2017; O’Connor, 2017a). Next, we ex-
plore the endogenous emergence of collaboration networks in a population that already
has discriminatory norms, finding that such networks tend to become segregated to the
point where there are no collaborative interactions across groups. Lastly, we examine
the simultaneous co-evolution of discrimination and collaboration, where we see partially
segregated networks evolve with some actors upholding the discriminatory norm. Overall
these results suggest that discrimination in academia may decrease the personal diversity
of collaborative networks. As described above, this may have negative impacts on the
ability of epistemic communities to arrive at successful beliefs.
The paper will proceed as follows. In section 2 we describe the Nash demand game,
which will be the base model employed here to capture discrimination in academic col-
laboration. We will justify the use of the model for epistemic communities in particular.
In section 3 we present our main body of results. We conclude by discussing the relevance
of these results to epistemic communities and to epistemic progress.
2 Academic Bargaining and Discrimination
As stated, our aim is to analyze the dynamics that surround discrimination and collabo-
ration networks in academia. This analysis is inspired, in part, by two sets of empirical
results. The first suggests that in epistemic communities, women may get less credit than
men for joint work. West et al. (2013) and Sugimoto et al. (2013), for example, find that
women are less likely in many disciplines to hold prestigious author positions. Feldon
et al. (2017) found that among early PhD students in the biological sciences, women
put in significantly more work, but are significantly less likely to be granted authorship
on the papers produced. Another set of results suggests that women are less likely to
collaborate than men are, and are more likely to collaborate with other women (Ferber
and Teiman, 1980; McDowell and Smith, 1992; Boschini and Sjögren, 2007; West et al.,
2013). Some findings suggest a similar pattern for black academics, with black criminol-
ogists less likely to co-author (Del Carmen and Bing, 2000). Botts et al. (2014) also find
that black philosophers tend to cluster in subfields.
Part of our question is: are these sets of results related? Does inequity in academic
collaboration lead members of certain groups to self segregate and thus decrease the effec-
see Haraway (1989); Longino (1990); Harding (1991). In addition, Page (2008) argues extensively that
cognitive diversity is important to creative work and problem solving, and may be generated by some
sorts of personal diversity. A large body of research from across the social sciences finds epistemic benefits
of personal diversity ranging from financial gains in firms where a significant portion of the leadership
are women and members of racial minorities (Dezsö and Ross, 2012; Richard et al., 2007), to improved
problem solving in small, racially diverse groups (Phillips et al., 2006), to increased information sharing
in racially diverse juries (Sommers, 2006).
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Figure 1: Payoff table for a mini Nash demand game.
tive diversity of collaborative teams? It is notoriously difficult to generate empirical data
testing cultural evolutionary pathways. To explore these questions, we instead employ
game theoretic models. Such models start with a game, or a simplified representation
of a strategic interaction. To represent division of labor and credit between academic
collaborators we use the Nash demand game (Nash, 1950).
This game involves two agents who divide a resource by each demanding some portion
of it.3 If the demands are compatible, each agent gets what she requested. If the demands
exceed the total resource, the agents get poor payoffs on the assumption that they cannot
peaceably agree on a division. Figure 2 shows a payoff table for a ‘mini’ version of this
game where actors have three demands—Low, Med, and High.4 For simplicity sake, we
assume that the total resource is 10, the Med demand is 5, L < 5 < H, and L+H = 10.
This yields, for example, demands of 3, 5, and 7, or 1, 5, and 9. Strategies for player 1
are displayed in the rows of the table, and strategies for player 2 in the columns. Each
entry shows payoffs to each player for some combination of demands, with player 1 listed
first. The poor payoff when actors over-demand the resource is assumed to be 0.5
It will be useful to take a minute to explain why this is a good representation of
academic collaboration. Academic collaboration involves joint action which creates a
surplus of a credit compared to solo work.6 However, this joint action necessitates two
types of bargaining. First, actors must decide who will do how much work on the project.
Second, actors must determine author order as a proxy for credit. The demands in the
game, then, are best understood as requests for author position relative to the amount of
work done. An actor who does the lion’s share of the work and requests first authorship
3Note that, since we only discuss two player games, our results may be difficult to apply to fields that
tend to have larger collaborations.
4Mini-games are commonly employed in evolutionary models of bargaining for tractability purposes.
See, for example, Skyrms (1994); Alexander and Skyrms (1999). See Sigmund et al. (2001) for a defense
of the mini-game approach.
5The exact value of these outcomes should not be taken too seriously as these details will not matter
much for the outcomes of the model. For instance, all bargaining failures (the project never getting
started, failing halfway through, etc.) are given a payoff of zero in this model. Realistically, they should
likely be assigned different payoffs, but as long as the payoff for each type of failure is substantially lower
than for successful collaboration, this idealization will not significantly affect results.
6Collaboration increases academic productivity, and collaborative papers are more likely to be ac-
cepted to top journals and to be cited. See Bruner and O’Connor (2018) for an overview of the literature
on this topic.
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makes a Med demand. One who does more work, and requests second authorship makes
a Low demand.7
Suppose we have a population with two social groups—women and men, for example,
or black and white people. Suppose further that actors can condition their choice of
strategy on the group membership of an interactive partner. In a cultural evolutionary
scenario, this induces a situation where separate norms can emerge within and between
groups.8 For the Nash demand game, under most reasonable evolutionary dynamics,
in-group members will most often evolve to all make fair demands of each other.9 One
of three things will happen between groups. Either the groups will come to demand
Med of each other, or else one group will learn to always demand High and the other to
always demand Low when meeting out-group members. Axtell et al. (2001) take these
two latter sorts of outcomes to represent ‘discriminatory norms’—actors treat in- and
out-group members differently, to the detriment of one out-group. We follow them in
using these outcomes as representations of discriminatory norms of collaboration.
There is one further preliminary we will introduce before describing our models and
results. Bruner (2017) outlines the cultural Red King effect—that minority groups can be
more likely than majority groups to end up disadvantaged in the emergence of bargaining
conventions. This occurs as a result of differential reactivity on the part of the groups.
While majority members rarely meet minority types, the reverse is not true, meaning
that minority members learn much more quickly how to interact with the majority type.
Since it is often best to make safe, low demands in the Nash demand game, these minority
types can then end up quickly learning a behavior that ultimately disadvantages them.10
In these minority-majority models, it is not always the case that small groups end up
disadvantaged as a result of their quick learning. As Bruner (2017) illustrates, under the
right conditions bargaining payoffs are such that making high demands is worthwhile de-
spite the risk, meaning that minority groups quickly learn to do so. This complementary
effect is the cultural Red Queen. For the mini games just introduced, a cultural Red King
is observed when L > 3, and a Red Queen otherwise. Below we will draw a connection
between our results on the impact of minority status on norms of collaboration and this
7There are some other, plausible frameworks we might have used. For example, models of the cultural
emergence of inequity sometimes focus on a hawk-dove game, or a version of a coordination game with
one preferred equilibrium for each player. (See O’Connor (2017b) for an overview and in depth discussion
of such models.) We, however, prefer a paradigm where an equitable outcome is available to the players,
which is not the case for these games. There are also more complicated versions of bargaining games,
where, for instance, actors bargain over many rounds in order to determine outcomes. We choose this
simplified version for tractability reasons. From an evolutionary perspective, it also makes more sense
to compress the actual process of bargaining and focus on the effects final bargaining outcomes have on
dynamics of cultural change.
8We follow authors like Young (1993) in labeling emergent patterns of group level behavior in models
as ‘norms’, though this is obviously a thin representation of real world norms.
9The other option is to evolve a ‘fractious’ pattern of bargaining where some actors make High
demands and others Low, meaning that miscoordination happens with relative frequency (Axtell et al.,
2001; Skyrms, 2014).
10O’Connor (2017a) replicates these results in agent based models. O’Connor and Bruner (2017)
discuss implications for academic communities in particular. And O’Connor et al. (2017) look at the
implications for intersectional populations.
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body of literature.
3 Networks and Bargaining
Now we use the framework sketched in the last section to build an explicit model of
academic collaboration networks. In our model, agents in the academic community are
represented by a collection of nodes. The presence of an edge, or link, between two nodes
means that a collaboration exists between the two individuals, whereas the absence of an
edge means that they do not collaborate. There are within group links, connecting two
nodes in the same social identity group, and between group links, connecting two nodes
in different social identity groups. The set of nodes and edges forms what we call the
collaboration network.
In what follows, actors belong to one of two social identity groups, where one social
identity group comprises a minority of the total population. We will be particularly
interested in results where the majority discriminates by demanding High when inter-
acting with minority group members who in turn demand Low. We will also take note
of the norm where the minority discriminates, demanding High against majority group
members, and the norm of fair division, where both groups demand Med against each
other. Our models assume that actors condition their behavior on the social identity of
their collaborative partners, so our results will only be relevant to understanding dis-
crimination and lack of diversity when the groups of interest are divided according to a
feature real people would actually condition their behavior on, e.g. race or gender but
not eye color.11
Our exploration of discriminatory norms and collaboration will proceed in three parts.
First, we show that when agents are on a network, the minority group can be disadvan-
taged solely due their relative proportion in the population. Second, we will show that
when there are preexisting discriminatory norms in the community, networks tend to
become completely segregated. Third, we show how these two parts of the story relate to
each other by providing a model where agents’ bargaining strategies co-evolve with the
structure of the collaboration network. We will see that discriminatory behavior tends to
arise between many members of the community. Further, as this behavior arises, the col-
laboration networks tend to become partially segregated, with agents mostly interacting
with others in their own social identity group.
3.1 Part a: the evolution of discrimination on fixed networks
First, we examine the effects of network structure on the evolution of discriminatory
norms. Poza et al. (2010) use a similar framework to show that discriminatory norms
do commonly arise on networks with agents of different types playing the Nash demand
game. In looking at these models with minority/majority statuses for the two groups,
11Similarly, our epistemic reasons for caring about diversity will only be relevant when there is reason
to think that diversity across a particular social identity line produces epistemic benefits, though, of
course, one can also care about diversity for non-epistemic reasons.
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we find that the minority group can be disadvantaged, in that they are more likely to
be discriminated against. Further, we investigate whether homophily, the tendency to
preferentially form links with members of your own social identity group (Lazarsfeld
et al., 1954; Jackson, 2010), exacerbates the effect.
3.1.1 Model
We use multi-type random graphs, networks which are used to model populations with
multiple social identity groups (Golub and Jackson, 2012). In this set-up, agents are
classified according to which type they are (in this case, whether they are a minority
or majority group member). Each agent has some probability of forming a link with an
agent of the same type, pin, and some probability of forming a link with an agent of a
different type, pout. If pin > pout, we say that the agents exhibit homophily.
Once the network is formed, agents update their strategies based on the payoffs
they receive by interacting with their collaborators—those they are connected to on the
collaboration network. Each agent’s strategy consists of two parts: a demand when
interacting with an in-group member and a demand when interacting with an out-group
member. These strategies are initially randomly assigned. Each round, agents interact
with all of their collaborators and, with a small probability, will decide to update their
strategy. Strategies are updated using myopic best response: in the next round, the
strategy an agent will use is the one that would have gotten them the best payoff in
the current round, given the strategies of their collaborators. This captures the fact that
agents are trying to choose a strategy that is likely to result in them getting the most out
of a successful collaboration, while avoiding the poor payoff from a failed collaboration.
3.1.2 Results
We look at the frequencies with which populations converged to different bargaining
norms. Cases where 2 or fewer agents were playing strategies outside the equilibrium
expectation were counted as converged since, based on the probabilistic nature of the
model, these agents may not have had a chance to update their strategies. The probability
of updating a strategy in any given round was .1. Simulations were run for 1,000 rounds
over networks ranging from 20 to 100 agents (in intervals of 20), where the high demand
(H) ranged from 6 to 9 and the minority group comprised 10% to 50% of the population.
While for all simulations the probability of a within group link was held fixed at pin = .4,
the probability of an out-group link pout ranged from .2 to .8. (That is, we look at
cases where the minority was twice as likely to collaborate with in-group members to
cases where the minority is twice as likely to collaborate with out-group members.) Each
combination of parameter values was run 100 times.
Within each group, populations nearly always evolved to the norm of equal division.
Between groups, populations most often evolved to the norm of fair division, but a
significant amount of the time they also evolved a discriminatory norm, as in Poza et al.
(2010).
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Figure 2: Convergence to different norms over size of minority group for H = 6.
We now look at whether minority status has any effect on likelihood of being discrim-
inated against. Figure 2 shows results for high demand, H = 6. For a small minority
group, it is more likely that the majority group will end up demanding High against the
minority. As the size of the minority group increases, the fair division becomes more
likely and both groups become equally likely to discriminate.
This effect results from an asymmetry in the average number of links for each group.
Consider a simple demonstrative example. If there are 10 majority group members, 5
minority group members, and 10 total between group links, on average majority group
members will have one between group link and minority group members will have two.
If a minority group member has two links, both of these collaborators would have to be
demanding 4 in order for their best response to be 6. At least initially, this would happen
with only probability 1/9. On the other hand, only one of these collaborators would have
to be demanding 6 in order for their best response to be demand 4 and, at least initially,
this happens with probability 5/9.12 In contrast, a majority group member having one
link to the minority would have a 1/3 chance of each of the strategies being a best
response (they demand the complement of whatever their collaborator demands). So, at
the start, a minority group member is much more likely than a majority group member to
demand 4 and much less likely to demand 6. This asymmetry drives populations toward
12To calculate the best response you compare the payoffs of each of possible strategies. So, for instance,
when an agent has two collaborators, the first of which demands 5 and a second that demands 6,
demanding 4 yields payoff of 4+4 = 8, demanding 5 yields a payoff of 5+0 = 5, and demanding 6 yields
a payoff of 0+ 0 = 0. Therefore, demanding 4 is a best response as it yields the highest payoff. One can
calculate the best response for the nine possible configurations of strategies among the collaborations
(Low and Low, Low and Med, Med and Low, etc.) to figure out the likelihood of the minority player’s
strategies being best responses. Note that adding a small probability of error when agents update their
strategies does not significantly affect our results.
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the outcome where the majority demands 6.
Our findings are somewhat similar to previous results on the cultural Red King/Queen
effect described above. However, minority disadvantage does not arise here due to an
increased speed of learning in the minority group, but rather due to differences in the
best responses of the group. Furthermore, while we observe minority disadvantage which
is analogous to the cultural Red King effect when H = 6, we do not observe an analogue
of the Red Queen for higher levels of H.
To understand why nothing similar to the Red Queen occurs consider the same sim-
plified example as above, but now with H = 9. Again, a majority group member having
one link to the minority would have a 1/3 chance of each of the strategies being a best re-
sponse, as they still only care about demanding the complement their collaborator. Now,
though, the minority group members are very unlikely to make the Low demand of 1; it
is only a best response with probability 1/9, when both of their collaborators demand
9. They are just as likely as the majority to demand 9 (doing so with probability 1/3,
whenever both their collaborators demand 1 or one collaborator demands 1 while the
other demands 9). More importantly, though, it is most likely that the minority group
member’s best response will be to demand 5. This will be the best response whenever at
least one of their collaborators demands 5, which happens with probability 5/9. So, the
evolution of strategies is again affected by the minority group’s initial best responses, but
in this case it is likely that the frequency of the Med demand in minority will increase,
followed by the majority learning to also make Med demands.
We also found that varying levels of homophily did not influence whether the major-
ity or minority group is more likely to discriminate.13 Since agents are updating their
in-group and out-group strategies separately, how the within group linking probability
compares to the out-group linking probability does not have an effect on how often the
network converges to a discriminatory norm. So, the existence of majority group advan-
tage does not depend on the existence of homophily.
3.2 Part b: existing discriminatory norms affect network formation
We now examine how the collaboration network will evolve when there is already a dis-
criminatory norm in place. An agent’s bargaining strategy is held fixed, while their
choice of who to collaborate with evolves over time. O’Connor and Bruner (2017) find
that in epistemic communities discriminatory norms can disincentivize collaboration be-
tween social groups. They look at a model where there is an option to work alone and
actors are not arrayed on a network, and find that minorities will learn to do solo work
more often when discriminated against. As will become clear, our results complement
this finding.
13Increasing pout did increase the probability that the collaboration network as a whole converged to
one of the possible norms. This is likely because with lower linking probabilities there are often some
nodes which do not have any links to the rest of the network (i.e., the network is not connected).
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3.2.1 Model
We employ a model similar to Watts (2003) in which agents can choose to form or break
links with other agents in the community based on their payoffs from bargaining with
those other agents. Each link represents a collaboration and therefore a payoff from the
Nash Demand game. Since we are investigating the effect of a pre-existing discriminatory
norm, majority group members receive a payoff of 6 from a between group link while
minority members receive a payoff of 4.14 Agents receive a payoff of 5 from within group
links, where there is a norm of fair division. Agents have a maximum number of links,
capturing the fact that there are a limited number of projects academics can work on.
A player can unilaterally sever a link, but both players must consent to a new link being
formed. This represents the fact that all the researchers involved in a collaboration must
consent to be part of the collaboration. If one person no longer wishes to collaborate,
the collaboration fails and the link is broken.15
The evolution of the collaboration network proceeds as follows. We begin with an
empty network (there are no links between any nodes). At each time-step, two nodes are
chosen at random. One of these is an agent who will update their links and the other is
a potential or current collaborator of the agent.
If we have chosen a potential collaborator, we determine whether both researchers
will consent to form a new link. If neither player has reached the maximum number of
links, they will both consent. (Getting some payoff is better than none.) If either, or
both, of them already have the maximum number of links, we check whether they will
break any of their existing links to form the new link. If a player can increase their payoff
by breaking their link with the lowest payoff in order to form this new link, they will
consent to the new link. If both players consent to the link forming, this new link will
form, and agents will break links to the collaborator with which they receive their lowest
payoff.16 If at least one of them does not consent, no links are formed or broken.
By contrast, if we have chosen a current collaborator, the agent has an option to
break the link and form a new one. A potential collaborator is chosen at random from
the community. Then, if the agent would get a higher payoff from linking to this new
potential collaborator, they try to form a link. If the potential collaborator would also
like to form a link with the agent, the link is formed. The agent breaks the link with
their old collaborator (and the agent’s new collaborator breaks their link with their lowest
payoff collaborator if they already had the maximum number of links).
14The particular values for the high and low demand do not affect the results.
15Rather than limiting the number of links, we might have used a model similar to Jackson and
Wolinsky (1996), where agents choose how to divide a fixed amount of time among different collaborations
(and there is some synergistic benefit from both collaborators spending more time on a collaboration).
However, this would add an additional factor into the model, the number of collaborations different
groups maintain, so in order to focus the analysis on discrimination and homophily, we use the model
of collaboration from Watts (2003).
16In the event that an agent has multiple collaborations yielding the same lowest payoff, the link that
is broken is chosen among them at random.
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Figure 3: An example of the evolution of a network with discriminatory norms, with
100 researchers, the minority group comprising 40% of the population, H = 6, and the
maximum number of links set to 3.
3.2.2 Results
Across a wide range of parameters, the network reliably converges to the point where
researchers only collaborate within their own group.17 Figure 3 provides an example of
how this occurs. Initially, links form steadily within each group and also between groups,
as researchers have not yet formed the maximum number of links. Once minority group
members have reached the maximum number of links, they begin to break their links
with majority group members whenever they have the opportunity to form a new link
with another minority group member, which yields them a payoff of 5 rather than a
payoff of 4. So, between group links decline and links within the minority group increase.
Simultaneously, links within the majority group increase. This is because, as minority
group members break their links with majority group members, the majority group
members look to form new links. Minority group members will refuse to form new links
with them, but other majority group members (if they also have less than the maximum
number of links) will agree to form the link. Note that in figure 3, fewer links exist
within the minority than within the majority simply because there are fewer minority
group members and so fewer possible links. The important trend is that links between
17We ran simulations for 10,000 rounds, varying the number of agents in the community (10, 20, 40,
60, 80, or 100), the percent of the community in the minority population (5, 10, 20, 30, 40, or 50), and
the maximum number of links agents can form (3, 10, or 20). As long as there were enough minority
members so that all the links could be formed within their group (e.g. if there were only 5 minority
groups members, but 20 possible links, they could not form all 20 links to other minority group members),
simulations show that the collaboration network reliably evolves to a point where at least 95% of the
links are formed within social identity groups rather than across.
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groups decrease over time until they are essentially non-existent.18
To this point, we have interpreted credit in the models here as resulting from pur-
poseful division among collaborators, but it is worthwhile pointing out that academics
do not fully control how credit is divvied out. There is evidence, in particular, that
members of traditionally disadvantaged groups do not receive as much credit for collabo-
rative work, even when author order is determined fairly. Sarsons et al. (2017) finds that
in economics, where author order is alphabetical, coauthoring does not decrease men’s
chances of getting tenure, but women who coauthor are less likely to be tenured. This
effect is not as strong when women coauthor with other women. The implication is that
the effects we have been describing might occur even when collaborators attempt a fair
division. If the payoff to minority types for between group collaboration is, in fact, lower
nonetheless, they still might learn to avoid such collaborations.
3.2.3 Bigger Academics, Bigger Pies
In the model we have just presented, the communal norm determines credit share for
all agents, and this predictably impacts the network structure. As we have pointed out,
those who are being discriminated against will want to avoid this discrimination. One
assumption of this model, though, is that agents of both sorts generate the same amount
of credit, which may not apply in certain cases.
There are (at least) two plausible scenarios where members of one social group will
produce more credit than those of another. The first is an interpretation of these models
where the groups are stages of the academic hierarchy—graduate students, post docs,
early professors, established professors, etc. In such a case, established academics have
the experience and social standing to publish better papers in better journals, and to
expect that their results will be more widely read and cited. The second plausible scenario
of this sort is one where members from a traditionally excluded social group are first
moving into a discipline. We can expect members from such small minority groups to
have less access to the sorts of experience and prestige just described, and so to produce
less credit on average.19
Importantly, such considerations can change the outcome of the models just discussed.
Assume that the different types of collaborative pairings—in-group collaborations among
established academics, between group collaborations, and in-group collaborations be-
tween less established academics— generate descending amounts of credit for the reasons
just described. Perhaps the total credit generated in the three cases is 15, 12, and 10.
Demands in the game are then for proportions of these resources, say .4, .5, and .6.
Varying these parameters, maintaining our assumption that discriminatory norms
hold, and always assuming that those who produce more credit are the discriminators,
we can yield three different sorts of outcomes. The first are those we have described in
18A few persist for long periods of time just by chance. If the simulation is run for long enough, all of
these links disappear.
19Minorities might also produce less credit if the type of projects they work on become labeled as
low prestige. Thanks to Liam Kofi Bright for this point. Schneider et al. (2017) use similar models to
consider this possibility.
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section 3.2.2. Second, there are parameters where members of both types are incentivized
to engage in only out-group collaboration. Suppose the three pie sizes are 15, 14, and 10.
The established group will get 7.5 for within group collaboration, and the less established
will get 5. For between-group collaboration, the payoffs will be 8.4 and 5.6 respectively.
In other words, the less established group is willing to do more work and get a smaller
proportion of the credit in order to share in the larger pie. The more established group
is willing to produce a smaller pie as long as they receive a larger portion of it. Such
a situation seems to correspond well with what we see when professors and graduate
students collaborate, for example.
There is a third outcome where we again see complete segregation, but for a different
reason. In this case, the established group produces such an excess of credit that they
are unwilling to collaborate with the out-group even when they can take advantage
of out-group members. For instance, if our pie sizes are 18, 13, and 10, the in-group
payoffs are then 9 and 5, while the between group payoffs are 7.8 and 5.2. Here the
less established group would like to collaborate, even if they do more work and receive a
smaller proportion of credit. But the established group is unwilling to do so.
3.2.4 Diversity and Credit
In the introduction we discussed the idea that diversity might be important to scientific
progress. If so, we might expect that the credit generated by diverse collaborative groups
will sometimes be greater than that generated by homogenous ones. Some empirical
findings back this up. Freeman and Huang (2015), for example, show that cross-cultural
collaborations generate more credit in the form of citations. Campbell et al. (2013) find
the same thing for gender diverse collaborations in ecology. And Barjak and Robinson
(2008) find that culturally diverse academic teams are more productive.
To capture such a possibility, we can alter the model so that while in-group collabora-
tions generate 10 units of credit, between-group collaborations generate more. Whether
or not homophily emerges will then depend on the level of discrimination and the size of
the credit boost from diversity. For instance, if between-group collaborations generate a
pie of size 12, and the minority group gets 40% of the credit generated, their expected
payoffs are 5 with their in-group and 4.8 with the out-group, meaning we should still ex-
pect segregation despite the extra payoff diversity generates. If we increase this number
to 14, the minority group now gets 5.6, and we expect individuals to form only between-
group collaborations. If we suppose more serious discrimination has emerged, so that
minority types get only 30% of the credit, say, it will take a between-group pie of 17 to
prevent segregation. Still, for any level of discrimination if there is enough of a credit
boost for diverse collaborations we should not expect homophily to emerge.
Schneider et al. (2017) use models like those presented here to discuss possibilities
for promoting diverse collaborations, despite natural tendencies towards homophily. One
such possibility is for funding bodies to give more grants to diverse collaborative teams,
increasing their average credit generated. This yields a model like the one just described—
between-group collaborations split a bigger pie than within-group collaborations. As
they point out, this does decrease homophily in network formation models. There is a
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downside, though. In the models we describe in section 3.2.2, while there is complete
homophily, there is no active discrimination occurring because no one maintains a col-
laborative bond where they receive the Low demand. In models where between-group
collaboration is incentivized, either by funding agencies, or the natural benefits of diver-
sity, minority groups will be willing to accept inequitable arrangements with out-group
members. These arrangements provide a net benefit over in-group collaboration, but
provide a much more significant benefit for those in the majority. What we see in such a
case is a tension between a social good (diverse collaborations that improve the progress
of science) and equity between individuals.20
The general take-away here is that the collaboration network we expect to evolve
will vary based on both the structural situation for academics (i.e., who is poised to
create credit), and on the existing norms of bargaining. In particular, there are multiple,
realistic configurations of these features that yield segregated co-authorship networks.
3.3 Part c: the co-evolution of bargaining with networks
So far, we have seen the effects of the collaboration network’s structure on the evolution of
discriminatory norms and, conversely, the effect of discriminatory norms on the evolution
of the collaboration network’s structure. In this section we explore what happens when
when we allow both agents’ strategies and their choices of collaborators to co-evolve.
3.3.1 Model
We start with an empty network, with each agent’s strategy randomly determined. In
each round, there is some small probability that each agent will take an action. There
are two types of possible actions: updating your bargaining strategy and updating your
set of collaborators. So, if an agent takes an action in the round, there is chance they will
update their set of collaborators and a chance they will update their strategy (agents do
not update both at once). Updating sets of collaborators is also done via breaking and
reforming links, as described in section 3.2. Strategies are updated via best response, as
described in section 3.1.
3.3.2 Results
We look at results for a network of 100 researchers where H = 6. We ran simulations
for 20,000 rounds, varying the size of the minority group from 10% of the population
to 50%, in intervals of 5%, and varying the maximum number of links (either 3 or 9).
Each combination of parameter values was run 100 times. In each round, agents take
actions with probability 0.1. If they act, there is a 20% chance they will update their
set of collaborators and an 80% chance they will update their strategy. (The particular
probabilities are not important; similar results can be obtained for a variety of values.)
20If there is a special benefit to collaborations from diversity, it might be the case that small minority
groups are then in a special position in that there are not enough of them to go around. This might
improve their bargaining power.
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Figure 4: Level of majority discrimination, given by the percent of the majority group
whose out-group strategy is to demand High, with different sizes of minority group.
As in section 3.1, within groups, the likely outcome was fair division, so we will focus
on between group strategies. We are particularly interested in the likelihood of majority
discrimination and the effect it has on the collaboration network. As figure 4 shows,
the larger the minority group is, the less likely it is that majority group members will
discriminate against them, just as in 3.1.
However, the patterns of discrimination in these models are different from those in
previous models. Groups do not end up at consistent norms where all members make the
same demand of the out-group. Instead we see outcomes where some discrimination and
some fair treatment emerge between groups. Figure 5 shows the evolution of between
group strategies for two different runs of the same simulation.21 In (a) we see an outcome
where more majority group members demand High and minority members Low. (b)
shows a run where both sides tend to demand Med. Note that in both cases, as mentioned,
the network does not fully settle into either norm. To understand why this is the case,
let us look at the evolution of the collaboration network.
As in section 3.2; both within and between group links increase initially, and then
between group links decrease. In particular, discriminatory between group links tend to
be dropped, while fair ones remain. Once an agent has no more links to the other group,
they stop updating their between group strategy. This explains why the network never
fully settles on one norm or another. Discriminators who have lost their minority group
links retain latent discriminatory strategies that are never updated.
Figure 6 shows the network structure of the two runs shown in figure 5. As is easy
to see, this process leads to collaboration networks which are homophilic, but not fully
segregated. In fact, there is a continuum of possible outcomes, ranging from everyone
21The minority group comprised 30% of the population, maximum links were set to 9, and the simu-
lation was run for 10,000 rounds.
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(a) (b)
Figure 5: Evolution of between group strategies over time. Data for the majority de-
manding Low and the minority demanding High are omitted for simplicity. (a) shows an
outcome where the high demand quickly spreads in the majority population. (b) shows
an outcome where the medium demand quickly spreads in the majority population.
 
(a)
 
(b)
Figure 6: Possible collaboration network outcomes. Pink nodes represent minority group
members and blue nodes represent majority group members. (a) shows an outcome
where demanding High is common in the majority population and homophily is .4921.
(b) shows an outcome where demanding Med is common in the majority population and
homophily is .1005.
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in the network reaching the norm of fair division (with no homophily in the network)
to all majority members discriminating (with a totally segregated network having no
links between social identity groups). Nearly all outcomes are somewhere between these
two extremes: partially segregated networks with some members of the majority group
upholding the discriminatory norm.
In order to quantify how the level of discrimination in a network impacts homophily,
we use the following measure of inbreeding homophily (which we will denote Ii) from
Currarini et al. (2009):
Ii =
Hi − wi
1− wi
where Hi is the proportion of a group i’s links that are within group links and wi is the
fraction of the population that group comprises. Thus, inbreeding homophily measures
how homophilic groups are (by calculating the proportion of their links that are within
group) compared to how homophilic they could be (the 1 in the denominator represents
100% of links being within group), while controlling for the possibility that groups could
make up different proportions of the total population (by subtracting wi in both the
numerator and denominator).
As figure 7 shows, more discrimination means more homophily. This is a very stochas-
tic process, as one can see from the wide spread of possible levels of homophily for each
level of majority discrimination. However, if we look at the regression line we see an over-
all trend where as more of the majority group discriminates, homophily is stronger.22
4 Discussion
We can now return to the empirical results mentioned in the beginning of section 2. As is
evident from parts (b) and (c) of the last section, our models suggest a connection between
evidence that women receive less credit in collaboration and evidence that women tend
to collaborate less and more often with other women. Furthermore, our models provide
a potential mechanism for in-group clustering in academia. Those who get less by dint of
discriminatory social norms may take steps to protect themselves from discrimination.23
What is the upshot for epistemic communities and epistemic progress? As mentioned
in the introduction, diversity has been championed as an important feature of successful
academic communities both by those in feminist epistemology/philosophy of science,
and by those doing formal work in social epistemology. Does the type of homophily we
attempt to explain actually impede epistemic progress?
There might be reason to think not. So long as diverse ideas are present somewhere
in a community, why should it matter whether collaborations happen between groups
22One might think that the results in figures 4 and 7 together imply that as minority size increases,
homophily decreases. We found that this is true with a few exceptions. These are possibly due to the
fact that the measure of homophily does not account for the fact that the maximum number of links
may affect groups of different sizes in different ways.
23An alternative explanation is that people just feel drawn to those like them. It is entirely possible
that both factors are at play in the real world.
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Figure 7: Level of homophily, measured using inbreeding homophily, with changes in
majority discrimination, given by the percent of the majority group whose out-group
strategy is to demand High.
or not? For example, suppose a researcher from one social identity group is likely to
figure out A and a researcher from another group B. If they collaborate, then they might
also together conclude C, which follows from A&B. However, the community has another
route to knowing C: A and B are published separately, then the community as a whole
has access to these ideas and concludes C for themselves.24 Okruhlik (1994) seems to
have a picture somewhat like this in mind—diverse researchers will generate and test
diverse hypotheses which will then be assessed by the usual scientific methods.
There are few reasons why we think diversity within collaborations might be impor-
tant. First, it is possible that A and B independently are not interesting enough to
warrant publication and that they are only valuable realizations insofar as they jointly
imply C. If this is the case, it is reasonable to think that A and B would never be published
on their own. This might be especially likely if members of one group struggle to publish
in top journals due to reputational effects. There is reason, as well, to think that the
actual process of collaborating with those unlike ourselves might influence deliberation
and discovery. For example, Sommers (2006) find that deliberation processes proceed dif-
ferently on racially diverse juries in that members share more information. And Phillips
et al. (2006) find improved problem solving in small, racially diverse groups.
Finally, even if collaborations with diverse authorship do not tend to be of higher qual-
ity, homophily alone can impede epistemic progress. Information spreads more slowly
through homophilic networks (Golub and Jackson, 2012), so a homophilic epistemic net-
work will be less efficient in that it will take longer for the community to reach various
24Thanks to Liam Kofi Bright for raising this concern.
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conclusions.25 Under certain assumptions, such homophilic networks can also prevent the
spreading of new and better scientific practices throughout the community as a whole
(Schneider, 2017).
Our models suggest a process by which academic communities can spontaneously
un-diversify in the face of discriminatory bargaining norms. Furthermore, they suggest
that such norms can emerge in academic communities under many conditions, and are
more likely to impact minority groups. As we note above, this may help explain patterns
observed in real communities where minority groups receive less credit, and tend to
collaborate less. Those interested in intervening on epistemic communities may find
these results useful in that they generate a theoretically well grounded hypothesis for
why we see such patterns.
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